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ample, Yolton ends a discussion of the happiness of God by saying: “Perhaps the happiness of spirits (and God) is just their superior knowledge.”
(p. 82, emphasis added)
In the end, Yolton has succeeded in intriguing me, but not convincing
me. It is at best an uphill battle to engage in the task which Yolton has undertaken for himself, and it may be that he has done the best that could be
done with what is to be found in Locke’s text. But if there are speculative,
theological and spiritual concerns positively informing Locke’s philosophy,
we have yet to fully uncover it.

Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction, edited by Sohail H. Hashmi and
Stephen Lee. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, xiii + 533
pages, $85.00 hardback, $37.99 paperback.
TOMIS KAPITAN, Northern Illinois University
This book is devoted to ethical issues concerning the use, deployment,
possession, and regulation of so-called “weapons of mass destruction”
(WMD). The topics are approached from a broad range of theoretical and
practical perspectives, with nearly half the space given to the views of six
major religious traditions. Also included are essays representing political
realism, natural law ethics, liberalism, feminism, and pacifism. Contributors were asked to address six questions:
• What are the general norms concerning the use of weapons in war?
• Is it ever justified to use WMD in warfare?
• Is it ever justified to develop and deploy WMD as deterrents?
• If some nations possess WMD, is it proper to deny possession to
others?
• Should there be a WMD disarmament?
• What are the policy options of the major ethical traditions concerning WMD?
This technique serves not only to distinguish major positions, depending
on how these questions are answered, but also to facilitate comparison
among the represented viewpoints. For the most part, the volume is historically sophisticated, sensitive to contemporary political concerns, and
replete with state of the art thinking about the ethics of WMD. With its
breadth and thorough index, it would be an excellent text for use in courses
devoted to war, violence, and international conflict.
The editors note that there is some diﬃculty in determining what counts
as WMD. Typically, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are cited,
but the question has been raised whether such mechanisms as economic
sanctions and machetes shouldn’t also be included, since both were used
to destroy hundreds of thousands of lives in the 1990s. Perhaps the best
distinction between WMD and “conventional” weapons is that the former
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cannot be employed without killing many civilians, that is, they are inherently indiscriminate. Still, one wonders just how sharp a demarcation this
is, since combatants and military installations can be the targets of restricted uses of WMD, and throughout history, conventional weapons such as
catapults, fire, exploding shells, and, more recently, aerial launched bombs
have been noticeably indiscriminate when used in places other than open
air battlefields.
With few exceptions, the contributions are well-written and informative, and both the editors’ introduction and Steven Lee’s conclusion are
particularly instructive. The first two essays, by Susan Martin and Paul
Szasz, nicely prepare the ground for assessing the subsequent normative
discussions. Martin supplies informative charts on types of chemical and
biological weapons, and also a chart on the comparative eﬀects of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. Szasz gives a persuasive reading of
“customary international law” according to which the use of chemical and
biological agents is illegal, though he acknowledges that the situation is
less clear concerning the use of nuclear arms.
The essays representing the major religions are largely descriptive,
though at least half of them also advocate. Nigel Biggar details both traditional and contemporary positions within Christian just war thinking,
and Martin Cook supplies a vivid account of the dispensationalist views
of evangelical Christianity according to which it is both inevitable and
desirable that WMD be used. David Chappell and Donald K. Swearer
emphasize the cosmopolitan attitude of Buddhist ethics which generally
favors elimination of WMD, with Chappell arguing persuasively that
Buddhist ethics calls for “changing economic ruthlessness and national
ambition into a community of interdependence through more inclusive
institutions of global governance.” Julia Ching, in her instructive essay on
Confucianism and contemporary Chinese politics, similarly argues that
WMD should be outlawed though a system of global governance. More
varied responses can be found within Hinduism. While Katherine Young
describes its pacifist tendencies and the pioneering opposition to WMD
by Gandhi and Nehru, Kanti Bajpai describes a political Hinduism that
“embraces” nuclear weapons and whose extremists rival those of dispensationalist Christians.
The essays by Sohail Hashmi and John Kelsay reveal that extremist
views constitute only one segment of opinion within contemporary Islamic
thought. Both describe the just war elements within the jihad framework.
Hashmi advocates a “Muslim WMD pacifism” by encouraging Islamic nations to eschew the possession of WMD, though he acknowledges that this
is a minority position within Islam. Reuven Kimelman and Joseph David
describe a variety of viewpoints within the contemporary Jewish discussion
of WMD, with David claiming that while the Jewish tradition “oﬀers no
single or conclusive answer” to questions about the use and possession of
such weapons, it points to their rejection. On the other hand, Kimmelman
concludes that Israel’s possession of WMD can be justified as a deterrent,
that unilateral disarmament by Israel and American—the “guarantors of
the security of the Jewish people”—would be immoral, and that the nuclear
club should “bully” other countries into compliance with treaties and conventions that limit or ban WMD.
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The essays representing the secular ethical viewpoints are largely concerned with articulating and defending answers to the questions posed.
Scott Sagan, representing the realist perspective, points out that while a
realist might predict that a state would use WMD in a preventive war, national interests may very well dictate otherwise since the use of such weapons can lead to dangerous proliferation. Susan Martin argues that realism
mandates a consequentialist approach to international politics which defends the possession of nuclear weapons because their powerful deterrence
value enhances state security. A deterrence strategy is opposed by others,
e.g., C. A. J. Cody, writing from a natural law tradition, and Henry Shue representing liberalism. WMD are eﬀective as deterrents only if there is a conditional intention to use them, yet, any use of WMD would amount to a massive violation of jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination.
Moreover, deterrence operates by arousing fear, heightening the mentality
of “supreme emergency,” and, thereby, causing escalation and proliferation.
Disarmament is preferable despite the diﬃculties of achieving it. The point
here is not that WMD do not deter; they do, whenever a state concludes that
there is too much to lose by waging war against a possessor of WMD. The
problem is that a possessor’s miscalculations, whether of its own strength, or
of the threats to it, or of the strength and resolve of its adversaries, increase
the probability that WMD will be used, whether in response to an overt aggression or as a first-strike option against a “potential” aggressor.
Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick, writing from a feminist perspective, are
also critical of the deterrence argument, not only because of the enormous
costs involved—they estimate that U.S. has already spent at least $4.5 trillion on its nuclear arsenal—but also because their possession makes their
use possible. For the same reason they oppose proliferation, and keenly
observe that the language of ‘proliferation’ by those who already possess
WMD has been instrumental in producing hostility in other states. However, they find themselves in an unresolved ethical quandary, for while opposing proliferation they are aware that the campaign of non-proliferation
favors the pro-Western balance of power. They conclude that feminists
should drop the vocabulary of “proliferation,” combat the tendency to
think of nuclear power in terms of sexual potency, and commit themselves
to bringing about nuclear disarmament and redressing the worldwide inequalities underwritten by U.S. military superiority.
Michael Walzer, by contrast, correctly observes that it is wholly infeasible to expect powerful nations like the U.S.A. to disarm in the presence
of proliferation. His preference is that the “enlightened liberal states”
do their utmost to block “dangerous states” from gaining WMD for the
sake of “civilized values,” and for this reason, he defends the invasion of
Iraq on the grounds that it prevented Iraq from gaining WMD. Walzer is
an easy target for the charge of “hypocrisy” against non-proliferationists;
why should some states be allowed WMD and not others? Robert Holmes
slams the simplistic division of nations into “good” and “bad”—a charge
that aﬀects not only the arguments of Walzer, but also those of Kimmelman, David, and Lucinda Joy Peach. There are no moral grounds for
defending non-proliferation that cannot also be turned into an argument for
total disarmament, viz., if it’s too dangerous for one country to have WMD,
it’s too dangerous for any country to have them. Claims about the moral
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superiority of “enlightened liberal states” are laughable given that the most
frequently cited candidates have been among the leading aggressors and
supporters of unjust regimes around the globe ever since WWII.
The essays by Robert Holmes and Duane Cady, articulating and defending varieties of pacifism, are the most philosophically proficient in the
book, though both are at their strongest in criticizing those who support
the possession and deployment of WMD. There is little question that a
pacific settlement of disputes is a moral ideal worth espousing and pursuing, and also, that it is morally correct to advocate a complete abolition of
WMD—precisely because their destructive force is so powerful and difficult to contain. But short of an eﬀective coordinated eﬀort on the part
of all nations to disarm, neither Holmes nor Cady provide a convincing
response to the simple query that confronts the WMD pacifist; what about
a situation of self-defense? Are we ever justified in taking up arms against
an aggressor? If so, are we not also justified in preparing ourselves for
defense against would-be aggressors, or at least, those who have demonstrated aggressive intent against us? If so, are we not justified in preparing
ourselves with weapons that either would actually deter them or would be
powerful enough to defeat them, e.g., WMD? I see an aﬃrmative answer
to each of these questions, however disturbing it might be.
The problem with the call for disarmament is this: because WMD are seen
as vital to self-defense given that some states already possess them, then it
is impractical to expect any nation to unilaterally disarm in the absence of
international mechanisms that would ensure universal disarmament. Few
nations will voluntarily abandon their defenses if it means submitting to the
hegemony of others, yet, at present, the dominant nations have not allowed
any international agency to engineer an eﬀective program of universal disarmament. This is a further reason to distrust non-proliferation arguments,
especially when it comes to one of the main regions where political tensions
and the likelihood of proliferation are the greatest, namely, the Middle East.
Israel, with its nuclear weapons, its record of aggression against neighboring
states, its atrocities against Palestinians under occupation, and its virtually
unqualified support from the U.S., provides Arab and Islamic peoples a legitimate concern for their own safety, and a real incentive to follow the lead
of Pakistan by acquiring WMD of their own in order to better their defenses
and political leverage. I fault Hashmi for not highlighting this concern, and
no one should be surprised or indignant if his advice for Islamic countries to
unilaterally abandon eﬀorts to acquire WMD falls upon deaf ears.

The Christian Platonism of Simone Weil, edited by E. Jane Doering and Eric
O. Springsted. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004. Pp.
xii + 252. $45.00 (hardback); $27.50 (paperback).
PATRICK SHERRY, Lancaster University, England
The work of Simone Weil (1909–1943) is still too little known among theologians and analytic philosophers. I hope that this volume will do something
to remedy this situation, both because of the quality of the twelve essays

